Truth and Travesties in the Telling and Retelling of Dada (Hi)Stories by Benjamin, Elizabeth
 Truth and Travesties in the Telling and 
Retelling of Dada (Hi)Stories 
 
Benjamin, E. 
 
Author accepted manuscript deposited in Coventry University Repository 
 
Original citation:  
Benjamin E. (2016) Truth and Travesties in the Telling and Retelling of Dada (Hi)Stories. In: 
Dada and Existentialism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. DOI: 10.1057%2F978-1-137-56368-
2_6 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057%2F978-1-137-56368-2_6 
 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The 
definitive, published, version of record is available here: 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F978-1-137-56368-2_6 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
  
161© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016
E. Benjamin, Dada and Existentialism, 
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-56368-2_6
6
Truth and Travesties in the Telling 
and Retelling of Dada (Hi)Stories
Dada scholars are bombarded with varied and often contradictory pri-
mary accounts of a movement that refused concrete definition, and whose 
claims of rejecting all labels are widespread and well-known. Through the 
movement’s dis- and re-assembling of art, language and life, a desire to 
re-write history becomes apparent. Accounts of the movement, especially 
those related by Dadas themselves, are rife with ambiguity, fiction, and 
varyingly absurd claims to authority. In this respect it is also a parody 
of historiography, in medias res of the actual cultural phenomenon that 
is Dada. The name of the movement itself presents, beyond its initial 
appearance as an infantile repetition of a single syllable, a word whose 
polyvalent associations give us ‘hobbyhorse’ in French, ‘yes, yes’ in vari-
ous Slavic languages, and in English a child’s early paternal moniker; yet 
together, these definitions only contribute to its linguistic inexactitude. 
Furthermore we know that, despite all attempts to attach meaning to the 
word, Tzara famously claimed that ‘Dada ne signifie rien’ [Dada means 
nothing] (in D3, p. 1).1 Pegrum explains that ‘the word Dada itself has 
1 It is instructive but not surprising that Da(da) is a word with functioning meaning (beyond its use 
as an infantile sound, or indeed as indicating the movement itself ) in most common world lan-
guages, including ‘nothing’ in Irish, perhaps unknowingly proving Tzara’s claim that Dada means 
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162 Dada and Existentialism
an undermining, destabilising function’, and that Picabia thought that 
its unique importance sprang from the way in which it ‘rest[e] le même 
dans toutes les langues, ne précisant rien, ne limitant rien’ [remains the 
same in all languages, clarifying nothing, limiting nothing] (in Pegrum 
2000, p. 173). From this we can posit that the word is both asemic and 
polysemic, providing a productive basis in ambiguity on which to build a 
movement that revelled in confusion.
Further exploration of accounts of Dada by its adherents on the ori-
gin and choice of this name are yet more convoluted. Ball’s early diary 
entry claims ‘my proposal to call it Dada is accepted’ (FT, p. 63). Ball’s 
statement relates to the eponymous review, rather than the movement, 
but the suggestion of ownership and/or invention of the name remains. 
While Huelsenbeck allows for Ball’s involvement, he does not give him 
sole ownership of the term, and writes that ‘the word Dada was acciden-
tally discovered by Ball and myself in a German-French dictionary when 
we were looking for a stage-name for Madame Le Roy, the singer in our 
cabaret’ (in AA, p. 32). Richter writes retrospectively that ‘I heard the two 
Rumanians Tzara and Janco punctuating their torrents of Rumanian talk 
with the affirmative ‘da, da’. I assumed […] that the name Dada, applied 
to our movement, had some connection with the joyous Slavonic affir-
mative ‘da, da’—and to me this seemed wholly appropriate’ (AA, p. 31).
Despite his historical status as ‘leader’ of Dada, an account from Tzara 
lays no claim to invention of the word, stating that ‘a word was born, no 
one knows how’ (in AA, p. 32). Tzara’s statement reflects the performative 
nature of his ‘characteristic’ immodesty,2 and is in part denied by Arp’s claim 
that ‘I hereby declare that Tzara invented the word Dada on 6th February 
1916, at 6pm. I was there with my 12 children when Tzara first uttered the 
word…it happened in the Café de la Terrasse in Zurich, and I was wear-
nothing. I use the word ‘most’ based on a sample of seventy languages, fifty-one of which present 
coherent meaning for ‘da’ or ‘dada’.
2 Accounts reference in great detail Tzara’s impresario character and boisterous performances. 
However, his more fragile side is less often referenced, which gives a skewed impression wherein the 
self-assured and self-promoting person of the history books dominates. Buot relates, however, that 
on the decline of the Cabaret Voltaire and the departure of Huelsenbeck and Ball, ‘[p]longé dans 
une forte dépression, Tzara a du mal à sortir de sa chambre’ [thrown into a deep depression, Tzara 
had trouble leaving his room] (2002, p. 60). This reveals a dependence on both activity and the 
presence of others which somewhat undermines the notion of his indefatigable confidence.
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ing a brioche in my left nostril’ (in AA, p. 32). These varying accounts not 
only demonstrate the privileging of performative artistic identity, but also 
highlight the parodic nature of Dada’s relationship with cultural history, 
the reification of which will be brought out in this chapter.
If, as Rex Last claims, ‘in a real sense, there are as many ‘Dadas’ as there 
are Dadaists’ (in Sheppard 2000, p. 172), what meaningful conclusions 
are we to draw from the varying texts as scholars of the movement? Is it 
possible, or even advisable, to arrange these accounts in terms of a hierar-
chy of truthful content? Should we favour the account of Ball, arguably 
the first Dada, who established the movement’s birthplace, the Cabaret 
Voltaire, yet who was among the first to distance himself from it? That of 
Huelsenbeck, who wrote notoriously bitter accounts—including accus-
ing Tzara of having ‘permitted himself to live all his life off a fame for an 
arrogated founding of dada’ (1974, p. 103)—and vied for leadership with 
other members of the movement? Arp, long-time Dada adherent whose 
pseudo-formal account is sprinkled with perceivable absurdities, perhaps 
in a deliberate attempt to undermine its own credibility? Or Tzara, who 
is historically accepted as the founder and/or leader of Dada and yet who 
denies ownership of the movement’s name?
Moving from this series of questions emerging from the discussion of 
the invention of the word ‘Dada’, along with its associated meaning(s) as 
both a word in its own right and as the name of the movement, this chap-
ter examines a selection of the ‘stories’ and histories of Dada, alongside 
Existentialist notions of ‘truth’, as well as in contrast with its opposing con-
cepts: lies, untruth, and doubt. Through its analysis of truth and travesties 
in a foregrounding of written texts from Dada and beyond, this chapter 
explores the importance of writing as not only a documenting of, but also 
a (de)construction of, the self. As Chap. 5 traced freedom through censor-
ship, so Chap. 6 evaluates the possibility of new truth through lies.
This investigation will be performed through three ‘non-fiction’ Dada 
methods—the memoir, the diary, and the manifesto—against three fic-
tional texts. Firstly I consider the memoirs of Richter (Dada: Art and Anti-
art, 1965) and Huelsenbeck (Memoirs of a Dada Drummer, 1974). These 
are analysed alongside two works of Tom Stoppard, a  postmodernist writer 
whose works often involve significant references to Dada: Travesties (1975), 
a play that is designed as a feasible fake, filled with genuine anecdotes and 
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164 Dada and Existentialism
sprinkled with historical accuracy, and Artist Descending a Staircase (1972), 
more evidently fictitious and yet which references a plethora of names, 
places and events, with a characteristic splash of postmodern confusion. 
Both plays are constructed in such a way that they fold back on themselves 
and partially repeat in an effort to destabilise the perception of a ‘correct’ 
storyline. Secondly I assess the role of the journal as illustrated in Ball’s 
Flight out of Time: a Dada Diary (1974), and Tzara’s ‘Zurich Chronicle’ 
(1915–1919). These are compared with Sartre’s La Nausée, a novel whose 
use of a protagonist in existential crisis promotes the importance of diary 
form as an Existentialist exploration and development of the self, as well as 
a constant re-writing of the truth. The manifestos are analysed primarily in 
their own right, but with the view to bringing out Dada’s own philosophy 
(as well as its alignment with core Existentialist thought), through its most 
clearly proclaimed expression of identity. This is particularly applicable if 
we consider the etymology of ‘manifesto’, which comes from the Latin 
manifesta: clear, conspicuous (Latdict).
The discussion of language and its relation with the Dada self will be 
central to this analysis, especially regarding Existentialist thought on the 
reciprocity of the creation and implementation of values. The memoirs 
are analysed with a view to assessing the usefulness of different types of 
retrospective, as well as comparing the notions of ‘lasting impressions’ 
and ‘fading memories’, and furthermore the Stoppard as a text entirely 
constructed from false memory. Discussion of the diaries will address 
the significance of the writing of the self at the time of happening, as 
well as its relationship with being seen and/or published, especially in 
regard to the process of editing. These texts are deliberately analysed in 
approximately reverse chronological order, so as to begin from the idea of 
the most distant memory of Dada (as defined by inevitable loss through 
temporal distance), and progress toward the most concentrated and ‘in 
the moment’ idea of Dada values.
 Truth and Lies, Faith and Disguise
Before analysing our key texts, it is useful to consider the etymology 
behind our terms ‘travesty’ and ‘truth’, in order to assess their relationship 
with the accounts and principles of Dada. The word ‘travesty’ is rooted 
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in the French travesti, ‘disguised’ (from Latin trans- + vestire (to clothe)). 
Conversely, ‘truth’ derives from the Old English trēowth, cognate of the 
Old Norse tryggth, ‘faith’ (All Dictionary.com). The ways in which dis-
guise can be used to deceive are closely related to the ways in which truth 
(and, by extension, faith) can be manipulated, including deception by 
feigning to deceive. In Stoppard’s Travesties, the character Henry Carr3 
states (on Tzara) that ‘he is obviously trying to pass himself off as a spy’ 
(T, p.  12), and later, that ‘to masquerade as a decadent nihilist—or at 
any rate to ruminate in different colours and display the results in the 
Bahnhofstrasse—would be hypocritical’ (T, p.  47; original emphasis). 
The pertinent underlying similarities and differences between the two 
terms ‘truth’ and ‘travesty’ are fundamental to an understanding of Dada 
and its (hi)stories. Is disguise essentially deception, or rather a reimagin-
ing of the truth? Is a travesty always to be considered a disaster, or can the 
word be used in a positive, creative sense?
Beyond these common definitions, our analysis must take into 
account the specifically Existentialist definitions of truth as expressed by 
Sartre, Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty. We have already seen that French 
Existentialist thought places the creation of values in the individual: this 
attitude has a delicate relationship with definitions and usage of ‘truth’ 
and its associated terms including ‘lies’ and ‘doubt’. Existentialist writ-
ing foregrounds subjectivity, and this includes subjectivity (or even 
non-existence) of truth. Sartre states that ‘la connaissance nous met en 
présence de l’absolu et il y a une vérité de la connaissance. Mais cette 
vérité, quoique ne nous livrant rien de plus et rien de moins que l’absolu, 
demeure strictement humaine’ [knowledge brings us face to face with the 
absolute and there is a truth of knowledge. But this truth, even if it gives 
us no more or less than the absolute, remains strictly human] (EN, p. 255; 
my emphasis). Merleau-Ponty’s theories provide a continuation of this 
embracing of the subjectivity of truth, stating that ‘toutes mes vérités ne 
sont après tout que des évidences pour moi et pour une pensée faite comme 
la mienne, elles sont solidaires de ma constitution psychophysiologique 
et l’existence de ce monde-ci’ [all of my truths are after all only obvious 
to me and for a way of thinking such as my own, they are united in my 
3 Names of Stoppard’s characters will be placed in italics, as they are fictional by design and are not 
to be confused with the individuals outside of the play.
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166 Dada and Existentialism
psychophysiological constitution and the existence of this world] (PP, 
p. 458; my emphasis). Beauvoir relates truth to ambiguity and, through 
this, back to subjectivity: ‘pour atteindre sa vérité l’homme ne doit pas 
tenter de dissiper l’ambiguïté de son être, mais au contraire accepter de 
la réaliser’ [to obtain their truth the individual must not try to dispel 
the ambiguity of their being, but rather to accept and embody it] (MA, 
p. 19). These Existentialist approaches to truth find their match in Dada 
writing, most notably through Ball, who claimed that the psychologist 
‘knows a hundred different truths, and one is as true to him as another’ 
(FT, p. 7).
Truth is productively connected to its opposite, the lie, or untruth, 
through Beauvoir, who posits ‘les vérités nécessairement partielles que 
dévoile tout engagement humain’ [truths that are necessarily partial that 
reveal all human engagement] (MA, p. 87; my emphasis). The homonym-
ically dual function of the English word ‘partial’ is instructive in relation 
to subjectivity of truth because truth is individual and based in choice. 
Furthermore, Beauvoir elucidates that ‘le mot mensonge a un sens par 
opposition à la vérité établie par les hommes mêmes, mais l’Humanité 
ne saurait se mystifier tout entière puisque c’est précisément elle qui crée les 
critères du vrai ou du faux’ [the word ‘lie’ has meaning through opposition 
with ‘truth’ established by people themselves, but Humanity cannot mys-
tify itself entirely because it is precisely humanity that creates the criteria 
for truth and falsehood] (MA, p. 195; my emphasis). We can extend this 
subjectivity while relating back to Chap. 3 through Merleau-Ponty, who 
theorises that ‘la vérité ou la fausseté d’une expérience ne doivent pas 
consister dans son rapport à un réel extérieur’ [the truth or falsehood of 
an experience should not consist of its relationship to an external reality] 
(PP, p. 393).
Fitting with the exploration of the many stories of Dada, in terms of 
being experienced and related as two very different things, Sartre states 
that ‘l’essence du mensonge implique, en effet, que le menteur soit com-
plètement au fait de la vérité qu’il déguise’ [the essence of the lie implies, 
in fact, that the liar is completely aware of the truth that they are covering 
up] (EN, p. 82), and furthermore that ‘il y a une vérité des conduites du 
trompeur: si le trompé pouvait les rattacher à la situation où se trouve le 
trompeur et à son projet de mensonge, elles deviendraient parties inté-
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grantes de la vérité, à titre de conduites mensongères’ [there is a truth in 
the behaviour of the deceiver: if the deceived were able to connect this 
behaviour to the situation of the deceiver and their lie, it would become 
an integral part of the truth, by way of lying behaviour] (EN, p.  84f; 
original emphasis). In lying to the press, and to history more broadly, the 
Dadas were not only aware of the truth of their situation, but also were 
creating a plurality of truth through the lie.
Connected tightly with the multiplicity of truth and the lie is doubt, 
which Sartre analyses in detail (cf. EN, pp.  191–92). To select points 
that are key to the current argument, he instructively notes that ‘le doute 
paraît sur le fond d’une compréhension préontologique du connaître et 
d’exigences concernant le vrai’ [doubt appears against a background of a 
preontological understanding of knowledge and of requirements concern-
ing the truth] (EN, p. 191; original emphasis), foregrounding that the 
implicit way in which we relate to knowledge (a version of truth) and 
doubt are intrinsically linked. Sartre develops this notion of doubt in 
relation to temporality, stating that 
Se découvrir doutant, c’est déjà être en avant de soi-même dans le futur qui 
recèle le but, la cessation et la signification de ce doute, en arrière de soi 
dans le passé qui recèle les motivations constituantes du doute et ses phases, 
hors de soi dans le monde comme présence à l’objet dont on doute (EN, 
p. 191f ).
[To discover oneself doubting is already to be ahead of oneself in the 
future which contains the goal, ending and meaning of this doubt, behind 
oneself in the past which contains the constitutive motivations of doubt 
and its phases, outside of oneself in the world as a presence to the subject 
of one’s doubt.]
Sartre’s discussion of the importance of doubt is reminiscent of a fre-
quently occurring (sarcastic) line in Travesties: ‘Intellectual curiosity is 
not so common that one can afford to discourage it’ (T, p. 47, among 
others). Stoppard’s comment on the state of affairs in early twentieth- 
century Europe, as well as the compulsion to create material with which 
the questioning intellectual can engage, can be filtered through a point of 
view of Dada’s desire not only to épater la bourgeoisie, but also to intro-
duce a provocation of intrigue in Dada scholars for years to come.
[AU7]
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168 Dada and Existentialism
Through the existence of Dada’s many tales the scholar is required to 
constantly research further, and will find not the truth, but a number of 
truths about the movement. Additionally, it might be said that this is part 
of Dada’s aim of provocation as a means to self-knowledge. Tzara claimed 
that ‘Dada doute de tout’ [Dada doubts everything], and warned ‘méfiez- 
vous de Dada’ [beware of Dada] (1996, p. 227). Perhaps this is part of 
a wider incitement for the reader to question traditions and narratives. 
Furthermore, in weaving falsities into the recording of history, Dada 
activities promote and celebrate Sartre’s notion of ‘discovering oneself 
doubting’, as well as being ‘ahead of oneself in the future’, ‘behind oneself 
in the past’, and ‘outside of oneself in the world as a presence to the sub-
ject of one’s doubt’. Dada created a relationship with itself that moved in 
and out of coincidence with reality, as well as a flexible approach to time 
that concealed the creation of false truths enough to introduce a lasting 
ambiguity. Our exploration of Dada film demonstrated Dada’s desire to 
evoke this ambiguity through states of dreaming. Here we can link it to 
the truth through Tzara, who theorised that ‘le sommeil est un jardin 
entouré de doutes. On ne distingue pas la vérité du mensonge’ [Sleep is 
a garden surrounded by doubts. It is not possible to distinguish the truth 
from the lie] (cited in Buot 2002, p. 22).
Further to this, Merleau-Ponty suggests that every action or thought is 
a truth of some sort, stating that
il n’est pas une de mes actions, pas une de mes pensées même erronées, du 
moment que j’y ai adhéré, qui n’ait visé une valeur ou une vérité et qui ne 
garde en consequence son actualité dans la suite de ma vie non seulement 
comme fait ineffaçable, mais encore comme étape nécessaire vers les vérités 
ou les valeurs plus complètes que j’ai renconnues dans la suite. Mes vérités 
ont été construites avec ces erreurs et les entraînent dans leur éternité (PP, 
p. 454).
[there is not one of my actions, not one of my even incorrect thoughts, 
from the moment that I have adhered to it, that is not directed towards a 
value or a truth and that does not consequently keep its relevance in my 
ongoing life not only as an indelible fact, but also as a necessary step 
towards the most complete truths and values that I have consequently 
known. My truths have been constructed with these errors and take them 
with them in their eternity.]
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Not only does Merleau-Ponty’s statement on the omnipresence of 
truth have value in relation to Dada’s outlook on the multiplicity of truth, 
but his emphasis on the importance of error reminds us of Beauvoir’s 
theory of ‘sans échec, pas de morale’ [without failure, there can be no 
morals] (MA, p. 15). This constant re-writing is not only a method of 
self- exploration, but also a means to finding personal truth: ‘Tout serait 
vérité dans la conscience’ [everything is truth in one’s conscience] (PP, 
p. 437). This is not only instructive in the sense of the subjectivity of 
truth, but also if we consider that we are never really able to know that 
that which we perceive is reality: everything is reality as we know it.
 Memoirs of (a) Dada, or, the Importance 
of Being…Tzara
Stoppard’s Travesties (1975) is a fictional account of the fictional meeting 
of Henry Carr with Tristan Tzara, James Joyce, and Lenin in wartime 
Zurich, all loosely based around the plot of Oscar Wilde’s The Importance 
of Being Earnest (1895). The play puts forward a collection of retellings 
by a rather senile Carr, giving a similar effect to that created by Dada’s 
various reports and diaries. Travesties integrates a number of postmodern 
techniques that are shared with its Dada counterpart, including playful-
ness, intertextuality, and of course fabulation. Stoppard’s play was first 
performed in the same year that the English translations of Ball’s diaries 
and Huelsenbeck’s memoirs were published (1974), lending the move-
ment and its fictional successor a notable temporal cross-over.
Stoppard based his historical references on Richter’s account, as well as 
Motherwell’s The Dada Painters and Poets (1989).4 Yet Travesties is a self- 
aware, self-confessedly less-than-accurate account: is this attitude more 
important than the inevitable bias the author risks portraying through his 
choice of source(s)? Ira Nadel claims that Stoppard would consider his-
torical accuracy secondary to ‘the imaginative encounter, the  possibility 
4 Huelsenbeck details that even during the production of Motherwell’s anthology a dispute broke 
out between Tzara and himself, allegedly over content (Huelsenbeck 1974, pp. 80–81), proving 
that perceptions of the movement and its historicisation differed, and that adherents never stopped 
vying for leadership.
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that these figures might have met and what they could have said’, and 
furthermore that ‘truth is not only imaginative but irregular’ (2008, 
p. 482). Indeed such parallels are not unprecedented: not only was the 
real James Joyce acquainted with Dada, but he was also once believed to 
be the movement’s founder; the varyingly hypothetical (yet highly pos-
sible) meeting of Lenin and Tzara is frequently posited, especially due 
to the apparent proximity of the Cabaret Voltaire to Lenin’s temporary 
living quarters on Spiegelgasse. Richter supports the claim (in AA, p. 16), 
and perhaps most tellingly, Tzara claimed (in a BBC recording in 1959): 
Je peux dire que j’ai connu personnellement Lénine à Zurich avec lequel je 
jouais aux échecs. Mais à ma grande honte, je dois avouer à ce moment-là, 
je ne savais pas que Lénine était Lénine. Je l’ai appris bien plus tard (in 
Buot 2002, p. 50f ).
[I can say that I personally knew Lenin in Zurich, with whom I played 
chess. But to my great shame, I must admit that at that point, I didn’t know 
that Lenin was Lenin. I learned that much later.]
Whether this is true or part of a long-standing Dada prank, the ele-
ment of embarrassment is certainly indicative of a lack of awareness that 
allows for the meeting to be simultaneously ‘true’ and ‘false’.
Travesties is constructed as two acts of Carr’s memories, that he recalls 
in a way that they become repeated and recycled. The predictable Chinese 
whispers effect created by this method is compounded by the second act’s 
inclusion of Wildean farce, centred on Carr’s deception of Cecily by pre-
tending to be Tristan Tzara. Meanwhile the ‘real’ Tristan Tzara is revealed 
to be posing as his fictional brother named Jack (‘my name is Tristan in 
the Meierei Bar and Jack in the library’ (T, p. 27)). It is thus clear that 
‘the merging or collapsing of identities and differences is the biographical 
fantasy at the center of the play’ (Nadel 2008, p. 483).
As a text that has little or no known connection to Dada or its adher-
ents, and certainly no claim by its author, Travesties not only demonstrates 
Dada’s continued use as a literary and artistic reference point throughout 
the twentieth century, but also raises questions about the nature of truth 
and telling. Travesties therefore might potentially be named a Dada text 
in its own right, making us wonder whether Stoppard himself could be 
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dubbed the (or a) ‘new dada’ (cf. Huelsenbeck on Sartre). Additionally, this 
fulfils Richter’s conditions of the Dada myth through his statement that:
From the beginning, Dada was thus replaced by a thoroughly blurred 
image of itself. Since then even the mirror has broken. Anyone who finds a 
fragment of it can now read into it his own image of Dada, conditioned by 
his own aesthetic, national, historical or personal beliefs or preferences. 
Thus Dada has become a myth (AA, p. 10).
It is instructive that Richter chooses to call Dada a ‘myth’, since the 
construction of myth is based in a delicate balance of truth and doubt, 
linking the two in the same way that we saw in Sartre. Richter’s description 
of Dada as fragments of a mirror also reiterates our findings in Chap. 2  
on the subjectivity of selfhood, the possibility of constructing and recon-
structing, interpreting and reinterpreting, one’s own identity.
The content of Richter’s Art and Anti-Art has taken a central role 
throughout this book, but here I would like to focus on the way in which 
Richter collects together memories that are not always his, as well as ana-
lysing the choice of content for what is one of Dada’s definitive primary 
sources. Published for the first time in German in 1964, it was quickly 
followed by its English translation in 1965. Richter was not present or 
active in each individual Dada centre that he describes, and confesses in 
his account both to inevitable bias, and reliance on the stories of others:
I shall not be able to confine myself within the bounds of academic art- 
history. I shall depend above all on my own memories and those of my 
surviving friends. […] Having been involved in this revolt myself, I shall 
try to tell what I experienced, what I heard, and how I remember it. I hope 
to do justice to the age, to the history of art, and to my friends, dead and 
living (AA, p. 7).
From the outset it is clear that Richter’s account will unavoidably be 
affected by his personal relationships, as well as inferring an edge of ‘fond 
memory’ rather than an entirely objective outlook. We can instantly com-
pare this to Stoppard’s Carr, who recounts his memories with fondness, 
as well as a slightly senile inaccuracy. Carr gets around this by claiming 
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that ‘No apologies required, constant digression being the saving grace of 
senile reminiscence’ (T, p. 6). Here the construction of memory asserts 
its priority over the truthfulness of the account.
Continuing his discussion of the reliability of accounts in relation to 
actual events, Richter states that
the image of Dada is still [i.e. in 1965] full of contradictions. This is not 
surprising. Dada invited, or rather defied, the world to misunderstand it, 
and fostered every kind of confusion. This was done from caprice and from 
a principle of contradiction. Dada has reaped the harvest of confusion that 
it sowed (AA, p. 9).
Perhaps Dada, like Stoppard, knew its audience, and preferred to 
privilege the process of storytelling over the accuracy of its content, a 
fundamental part of mythmaking. Yet despite this portrayal of Dada as 
something as simultaneously undefinable and multiplicitously definable 
as its name, Richter still claims three categories for ‘proof ’ that events 
happened (which he forwards as having been his criteria for inclusion of 
‘facts’ and ‘events’ in his own text):
 1.  Dates and facts supported by published documents, diaries, etc., 
dating from the period itself.
 2.  Dates and facts for which there is no documentary proof dating 
from the period, but for which there are at least two disinterested 
witnesses or testimonies.
 3.  Dates and facts which can only be attested to by the author or one 
friend (AA, p. 10).
Was Richter genuinely trying to provide an accurate account of his 
former movement? Or is this yet another tongue-in-cheek refusal of the 
authority of the written text? It is precisely this ambiguity that makes 
his work a key player in the history of Dada, gently reminding us that 
though the text is one of the most comprehensive pieces of documenta-
tion of Dada, it is also written by a Dada member.
Richter’s own text does not always clarify who is ‘talking’, nor does he 
reference consistently or clearly. This initially suggests the  problematic 
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notion of Richter’s account being interpreted as a desire for a single, 
homogenised viewpoint, reducing Dada’s wildly heterogeneous individu-
ality. However, we might instead say that this text is a collage of fond 
memories of a movement that refused definition, faithfully preserved in 
its ambiguity and productively incorporative of ‘errors’ (cf. Beauvoir (MA, 
pp.  38–39); Merleau-Ponty (PP, p.  454)). Richter’s text highlights an 
often overlooked cross-over between primary text and post facto account, 
primarily because it straddles the divide between primary and secondary 
source itself, but also because it effectively calls into question the author-
ity of both texts written by Dada adherents and secondary accounts.
Both Richter’s account and Travesties foreground the notion of playing 
a role, or playing an identity, whether this is constructing and projecting 
a self-created identity, or absorbing an externally conceived image of the 
self, inadvertently or deliberately perpetuating the character in the course 
and recording of history. This is particularly visible in the historicised 
‘character’ of Tzara. I would argue that this began through the creation 
of the name: on taking on a multifaceted moniker—with meanings in 
French, German and Romanian—the former Samuel Rosenstock initi-
ated a play of not only words, but also identity. Disengagement with the 
past was a key Dada theme: here Tzara could be argued to be the most 
disengaged of all adherents, fully changing his name in 1915, just before 
embarking on Dada (so not changing it for Dada, nonetheless). Tzara was 
not the only Dada who changed his name around the time of or because 
of the movement. Others include Hannah Höch (Schwitters added the 
‘h’ to the end of Hannah to make it a palindrome), John Heartfield (b. 
Helmut Herzfeld), and George Grosz (b. Georg Ehrenfried Groß). The 
common theme of nationality is no coincidence: often German(ic) mem-
bers changed their names to distance themselves from national or politi-
cal association.
Nadel’s suggestion that Travesties is a ‘merging or collapsing of identi-
ties’ is an effect that comes across in Richter’s account, which as we have 
seen displays an occasional lack of differentiation between ‘characters’. 
However, through the constant need to reinvent oneself that is brought 
out by the name-changing habits of the Dadas (including such grandi-
ose epithets as Dadamax (Max Ernst) and Oberdada (Johannes Baader)), 
we can move beyond a merging of identities and posit a multiplicity of 
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identities. This no doubt stems from the movement’s refusal of concrete 
definition, as the presentation of a perpetual non-coincidence with the 
self challenges the reader to question every account. Furthermore, break-
ing with, while remaining in, a creative relationship with the past, links 
Dada and the individual Dadas with Beauvoir’s theory that ‘on n’aime 
pas le passé dans sa vérité vivante si on s’obstine à en maintenir les formes 
figées et momifiées. Le passé est un appel, c’est un appel vers l’avenir qui 
parfois ne peut le sauver qu’en le détruisant’ [we do not love the past in its 
living truth if we stubbornly maintain fixed and mummified forms. The 
past is a call, a call towards the future which sometimes can only save the 
past by destroying it] (MA, p. 118). Dada accounts demonstrate a need 
to both consider the truth a living (and thus malleable) present entity, 
but also a desire to change any potential future(s), and moreover that it 
embodied fundamentally more than the simple negation of the past that 
the movement is often considered to be.
Brigitte Pichon states that ‘the writing of history is the writing—the 
construction—of stories’ (in Pichon and Riha eds. 1996, p. 7). In order 
to illustrate the desire for ambiguity of cultural and historical memory 
construction through the distortion of ‘truth’ in Dada, we can look at an 
example of an event that was reported in different ways: the mock duel 
between Tzara and Arp near Zurich. We have seen that one of Dada’s 
strongest tools in the construction of hybrid or ambiguous meaning 
was manipulation of the press. Because of its scandalous reputation as 
a movement, which nevertheless maintained a productive relationship 
with the European cultural scene, members were able to feed stories to 
the media, sowing confusion at the time, and weaving in a subtle manip-
ulation of history for years to come. The announcement for the Rehalp 
duel was sent by the Dadas to around thirty newspapers in Switzerland 
and beyond:
Sensational Duel. We have received this report from Zurich, dated 2nd July 
[1919]: A pistol duel occurred yesterday on the Rehalp near Zurich 
between Tristan Tzara, the renowned founder of Dadaism, and the 
Dadaistic painter Hans Arp. Four shots were fired. At the fourth exchange 
Arp received a slight graze to his left thigh, whereupon the two opponents 
left the scene unreconciled. […] We have learned that the Zurich 
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 prosecutor’s office has already opened up an investigation into all those 
involved. Its findings the [sic] will certainly interest the public greatly. (in 
ZC, p. 34).
This report introduces falsehood in varyingly obvious levels, backed 
up with varying levels of authority. The publication in the press of this 
account endows upon it a certain degree of reality, but the depiction of 
events does not seem particularly likely (especially to contemporaneous 
readers familiar with the young Dada movement). Nevertheless the final 
words referring to the authority of the police add an element of doubt 
to the parody, especially because Dada had regular interaction with this 
particular authority.
Tzara recorded the same event, in his ‘Zurich Chronicle’ (1915–1919) 
as ‘mock duel Arp + Tzara on the Rehalp with cannon but aimed in the 
same direction audience invited to celebrate a private bluish victory’ (ZC, 
p. 34). Does Tzara’s statement mean that the duel did not, as we suspect, 
happen at all, or does it simply imply that the event was staged? We are 
told by Richter that one of the cited ‘witnesses’ of the event, the poet 
Jakob Heer, sent in a disclaimer to the press, only to be countered by a 
Dada response from two (Dada) witnesses, confirming Heer’s presence.5 
Huelsenbeck notes that the report was ‘a COMPLETE FABRICATION 
from someone wishing us ill’ (in ZC, p. 34). We must bear in mind that 
according to Richter’s own rules both would be considered true accounts, 
owing to the presence of witnesses and documents to support each side. 
The event was reported, along with dates, in the Zurich press, as well as 
in Tzara’s diary (both dating from the period itself ). Witnesses backed 
up these accounts: for Tzara, Walter Serner and Heer, and for Arp, Otto 
Kokoschka and Picabia (ZC, p. 34). Finally, Richter himself attests to the 
occurrence of the event. In this way, all three of Richter’s rules have been 
adhered to, giving the event a certain logical consistency, even if it is only 
in the context of the movement itself.
By infiltrating the press in this way, Dada erodes our foundations 
of truth in relation to authority. Sheppard explicates that the point of 
5 Ball cites Heer as ‘one of our most regular customers’ at the Cabaret Voltaire, whose ‘voluminous 
cloak sweeps the glasses off the tables when he walks past’ (FT, p. 58). Is Heer’s denied presence 
another Dada-style prank on the part of the poet?
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sending in false reports such as the duel was ‘to unmask the unreliability 
of the printed word and so generate an attitude of scepticism toward 
“authorities” in general and the authority of the press in particular’ 
(2000, p. 181). One may be naturally more inclined to believe or respect 
the printed word, especially that of a newspaper, despite the fact that 
evidently neither being published, nor simply claiming something as fact, 
makes it true. The press is a longstanding example of the construction of 
daily events and thus cultural history. But what are the consequences and 
effects on the reader of discovering that such an established authority is 
vulnerable to undermining? And how does this relationship with author-
ity affect the creators of the fiction? The creator is allowed the possibil-
ity of freely presenting or inventing truth and fiction, and the reader is 
obliged to interpret what they see, rather than blindly accepting it.
Richter claims that ‘the public likes nothing better than to be made 
fun of, provoked and insulted’, because it is ‘the moment when the 
public finally begins to think’. So by lying to the readers in this way, 
‘they all go home with a contented feeling that self-knowledge is the first 
step towards reforming oneself ’ (AA, pp. 66; 66; 67). This collection of 
 statements represents a useful provocation of personal truth and a con-
sequent proposing of authenticity through choice, an incitement not to 
simply take on pre-packaged values as so flagrantly offered by traditional 
narratives. Additionally, while Sheppard highlights the undermining of 
authority as a purpose of this type of venture, it seems appropriate to 
suggest that, beyond this aim, Dada was asserting its own authority, by 
levelling notions of reliability. As a self-reflexive product of this manipu-
lated authority, Dada’s effort represents an attempt to undermine author-
ity, level authority, and undermine itself as authority: a compound and 
perpetually replicating process that we began to explore through the con-
cepts of authority and deviance.
The oral invention of the word Dada may have been openly ambigu-
ous, but Richter writes that ‘the word Dada first appeared in print at 
the Cabaret Voltaire on 15th June 1916; this is a fact’ (AA, p.  32; my 
emphasis). Richter’s use of the word ‘fact’ is instructive because of its 
reliance upon the authenticity lent to a statement through its occurrence 
in print or in the press. We also know that the word dada (in its general, 
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lower case sense) did not literally appear in print for the first time under 
the circumstances that Richter presents (the term has been around in 
some form since the seventeenth century), but it may have done in the 
specific context of the little magazine and/or the movement. If Dada 
deliberately undercuts the authority of the press, this statement about its 
own press cements the movement’s parodic relationship with historicity. 
Additionally, the highlighting of their own press as ‘to be questioned’ 
underlines Dada’s desire to not be taken as an authority, especially as it 
was those in traditional positions of authority who (mis)used this power 
to wage war. We will discuss towards the end of this chapter how this 
mistrust of (self-)authority interacts with the creation of a ‘system’ of 
morality.
Memoirs of a Dada Drummer is a collection of essays by Huelsenbeck, 
written after the Dada period. Huelsenbeck’s account is an aggressive 
attempt to reassert his role in Dada, despite his denial of any associa-
tion when he moved to the United States. This cross-continental migra-
tion combined with denial was not necessarily through any malice on 
his part; rather, affiliation with Dada was varyingly persecutable, from 
threats against livelihood to threats against life. Unlike Tzara, who 
changed his name shortly before Dada, seemingly to embrace his new 
life in Zurich, Huelsenbeck changed his name, to Charles R. Hulbeck, 
on leaving Europe, ‘motivated by a desire to relinquish Dada completely’ 
(Kleinschmidt in Huelsenbeck 1974, p. xxiii). However, he was one of 
the only Dadas to claim that Dada never died, claiming that ‘it has never 
grown old and even today, after fifty years, it shows no symptoms of old 
age or senility’ (Huelsenbeck 1974, p. 136). It is (perhaps deliberately) 
difficult to know what Huelsenbeck means by this, and we may conclude 
that he simply implies that the spirit of Dada never died, and never will.
Huelsenbeck’s account differs from Richter’s in that although 
Richter’s is told from a single viewpoint (Richter being the sole author), 
Huelsenbeck’s account rarely acknowledges the presence of other opin-
ions. In this sense his account is a personal memoir, an autobiography, 
rather than a memoir or biography of Dada. Memoirs crosses several types 
of text through this style: like Richter, Huelsenbeck comments on the 
movement from outside of it (temporally speaking) but, like Ball, his is 
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an account of personal experience of the events. A third element, pres-
ent in differing levels across these three accounts, is the (arguably failed) 
effort towards a distanced analysis, as evident in Huelsenbeck’s essay ‘The 
Case of Dada’ and the presence of several accounts on Dada adherents 
including Tzara and Richter.
The different ways in which Richter and Huelsenbeck tell the stories 
of Dada can be compared again to a Stoppard play: Artist Descending a 
Staircase (1972). The play describes the demise of an artist from the point 
of view of his various peers, and at whose hands he possibly came to 
his unfortunate end. Artist Descending, while not directly incorporating 
Dada or its adherents, alludes to Duchamp not only through the play’s 
title, but also through his characters Martello and Beauchamp, whose 
phonetic similarity cannot be accidental.6 Not only have Stoppard’s char-
acters changed their names over time, but they also adapt their memory 
of events for their personal gain. Artist Descending is divided into eleven 
scenes, structured around dates and events to form a precise symmetry. 
The chronology begins in 1972, moves through 1922 and 1920 to a cen-
tre of 1914, and then systematically reverses back to 1972. This structur-
ing gives the feel of a deliberate manipulation of memory as none of the 
four separate time periods is told with any greater clarity than others. 
The older times are not told as memories, either, but in situ. Though 
not as symmetrical, Huelsenbeck’s collection flits between times in a 
similar way as Artist Descending. Both texts present their ‘story’ (taking 
Huelsenbeck’s collection as a whole) in medias res, a method that we saw 
earlier as forming a fundamental part of Dada’s means of parodying his-
tory. Additionally these means of storytelling question the authenticity of 
reproduction in a similar way to that of Neo-Dada explored in Chap. 5. 
Both stories depend upon their originals in a way that suggests inauthen-
tic reproduction, yet both produce something new and as such authentic 
as a product in its own right.
6 It might additionally be argued that Artist Descending hints at Neo-Dada through experimental 
(tape) music: over the course of the play, Beauchamp records, overwrites and interprets the sounds 
of the apartment, creating a creative multiple exposure in the style of both experimental music and 
Dada’s relationship with History. The product is distorted and multiple, simultaneously linear and 
circular, but all versions are still present.
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 Diaries and Journals: Documenting the Self
Moving on from Richter’s and Huelsenbeck’s texts as Dada ‘memoirs’, 
Ball’s Flight out of Time: a Dada Diary is a subtly different medium for 
the documenting of the self. Although all three texts (Ball’s, Richter’s and 
Huelsenbeck’s) were adapted for publication, only Ball’s was written at 
the time of Dada, in the form of a journal. Ball completed the editing 
of his diary for publication shortly before his death in 1927 (the diary 
itself finishes in 1921). The work was first published in German in 1927, 
an edition was published in 1947, and the English language edition was 
published in 1974. We saw that Richter’s first ‘rule’ for the validity of 
accounts not only stressed the high status of published documents of the 
movement, but also included the diary as an important means of record-
ing the period as it happened. In this respect it is worthwhile considering 
the role of fiction that is written in this way. Sartre’s La Nausée is particu-
larly instructive to analyse because the novel highlights the importance 
of diaries or accounts in a diary style, as well as the compound factor of 
the protagonist’s project of documenting a historical figure (something 
he gives up when his nausea reaches its peak). La Nausée is also useful in 
terms of philosophical content in a work of fiction: as such it provides 
a readily accessible summary of many of Sartre’s themes and concepts 
expressed considerably more verbosely in L’Être et le néant.
Cohn comments that La Nausée’s journal form is doubly significant:
first, by eliminating connectives or “verbal” flow, Sartre obtains for his 
fragments a total simultaneity much like that of poetry since, say, Rimbaud. 
[…] Secondly, the journal-form allows for the interpenetration of past and 
present, of action and comment, such as we see in Proust (1948, p. 63).
To take this further than Rimbaud and Proust, we might compare 
Sartre’s flow of fragments to the Dada simultaneous poems, as we saw 
in Chap. 2, whose lines intermingle to the extent that no single line 
takes precedence over others and we are forced to hear the mélange in 
its incomprehensible entirety. Throughout La Nausée the protagonist, 
Antoine Roquentin, develops an increased awareness of himself through 
the flow of images created by the diary. The flow is neither linear nor 
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truth-based, yet enables Roquentin to construct his world in fragments 
and through active interpretation. By constantly narrating the present he 
is able to decipher his nausea and come to terms with his experiences, in 
a way that we saw in Sartre’s ideas on temporality and the importance of 
doubt. This is similar to the way in which Ball wrote in order to make 
sense of his environment; doubt is found throughout the diary in his 
constant questioning of his activities (and including the fact that he ‘left’ 
and returned to Dada several times). It is clear that the diary form is val-
ued in Dada as well as in Existentialism: Arp wrote of Ball’s diary that ‘in 
this book stand the most significant words that have thus far been written 
about Dada’ (1949, in Motherwell ed. 1989, p. 293).
The way in which both Ball and Roquentin narrate the events of Dada 
and the novel respectively (and fundamentally, their own lives) occa-
sionally falls into the cyclical patterns presented by Carr’s narration in 
Travesties. This latter text becomes like a diary with the repetition of ‘Yes, 
sir. I have put the newspapers and telegrams on the sideboard, sir’, which 
becomes a common precursor to temporal slips and recaps. Though Carr’s 
stories are subject to his failing memory, they maintain their likeness 
with Roquentin’s through their aspect of correction through re-telling. 
On occasion Roquentin admits to having not told the truth—‘du moins 
pas toute la vérité’ [at least, not the whole truth] (N, p. 24; my empha-
sis). He appears fascinated by his ‘lie’ (omission) and wonders why he 
would deceive himself in this way. This self-deception is something that 
he revisits later, stating that ‘je viens d’apprendre, brusquement, sans rai-
son apparente, que je me suis menti pendant dix ans’ [I have just learned, 
suddenly, for no apparent reason, that I have been lying to myself for ten 
years] (N, p. 61).
This statement from Roquentin has a strange relationship with the 
diary process. Indeed the character had earlier noted that ‘je pense que 
c’est le danger si l’on tient un journal: on s’exagère tout, on est aux aguets, 
on force continuellement la verité’ [I think that is the danger of keeping a 
diary: you exaggerate everything, you are on the look-out, you constantly 
force the truth] (N, p. 13). How can we reconcile the ability to (acciden-
tally or deliberately) lie to oneself with the need to ‘constantly force the 
truth’? We do not necessarily need to consider Roquentin’s worry about 
his self-deception a time-span to be written off: rather, we can explicate [AU18]
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it as a sudden awareness of the perception of self and the authenticity of 
an engaged means of thought. As Ball writes, ‘I read Rimbaud differently 
today from a year ago’ (FT, p. 94): it is not surprising that our relation 
of self to world would be fluid and variable, not to mention subject to 
development. The diary form notably encourages this constant rethink-
ing of the truth and its meaning, and the way it may change over time. 
Roquentin’s ‘realisation’ that he had been lying to himself may then be 
itself an exaggeration: at the time of writing, he believed he was recording 
the truth, and thus it is a form of truth in its own right. It only becomes 
falsehood on the changing nature of truth(s) over time. Yet remember-
ing, forgetting, and documentation all relate to our definitions of truth. 
Roquentin expresses the concern that he does not even exist, and this 
is because he has little relation to public record, and thus little impact 
on society. He writes, ‘Je n’étais pas un grand-père, ni un père, ni même 
un mari. Je ne votais pas, c’était à peine si je payais quelques impôts’ [I 
was not a grandfather, nor a father, nor even a husband. I did not vote, 
I barely paid any taxes] (N, p. 127). Perhaps it is his lack of influence on 
others that compels him to record himself for posterity: furthermore, this 
need to record would inevitably affect the self-awareness of his writing 
style.
The way that Roquentin considers himself outside of time through 
his familial detachment can be compared and contrasted with Cohn’s 
comments on the ‘interpenetration of past and present’, as well as Sartre’s 
thoughts on our relationship with the position of the self in time that 
we saw earlier in the chapter (cf. EN, pp. 191–92). Roquentin sees him-
self as disconnected because of his lack of impact on his environment, 
but his severance also allows him to see more clearly his isolated self- 
development. Valerie Raoul links the diary to a way in which to monitor 
and/or change the way time passes, in that
the diary provides […] a trace, something that continues into the future. 
The role of the narrator-actor as potential reader is dependent on the sur-
vival of the written record. It is Roquentin’s critical comments on rereading 
his entries […] that convey the sense of a changing and unseizable exis-
tence, as much as his reflections on the difference between “then” and 
“now”’ (1983, p. 705).
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A particularly poignant moment in relation to the inevitable passing 
of time is in Ball’s diary when he notes: ‘I scribble and look down at 
the carpenter who is busy making coffins in the yard’ (FT, p. 66). Ball’s 
comment manages to simultaneously remind the reader of the daily hor-
ror of wartime mass slaughter and the existentially troubling notion of 
the unusually heightened awareness of one’s own mortality. It is also a 
reminder of the inevitable alienation of the self from the idea of one’s 
death: we simply cannot completely conceive of our own non-existence, 
and thus this thought produces an anxious tension of thinking about 
the self as object, while not being able to detach from the self as subject. 
Richter described Ball in terms of his philosophical position in a way that 
furthers this implication of an underlying Existentialist way of thinking:
There can be no doubt of Ball’s unswerving search for a meaning which he 
could set up against the absurd meaninglessness of the age in which he 
lived. He was an idealist and a sceptic, whose belief in life had not been 
destroyed by the deep scepticism with which he regarded the world around 
him (AA, p. 13; original emphasis).
Richter’s interpretation of Ball’s world view presents an individual 
confronting the absurd, yet maintaining an optimistic outlook despite 
professed scepticism.
The editing process of diaries, particularly in its additive form, per-
forms a constant redefinition of truth, leading us to definitions of iden-
tity and role of the diary as something to be (re)read. Raoul considers this 
in relation to temporality, as well as the developing relationship between 
writer, journal and reader:
The process that aims at defining the self as it recedes into the past para-
doxically contributes to the emergence of a new present self-as-writer and 
posits the future role of the self-as-reader. The journal, meanwhile, acquires 
an autonomous existence as a written text (1983, p. 706).
This relationship is additionally highlighted by the Autodidact, who 
asks Roquentin at one point, ‘N’écrit-on pas toujours pour être lu?’ 
[Don’t we always write with a view to being read?] (N, p.  169). This 
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question, along with Raoul’s discussion, moves the authority and own-
ership of words from the writer to the reader. We may wonder if the 
Autodidact’s question is still applicable if this reader is only the author, 
as the notion of re-reading will change the course of personal narrative. 
Notably, although Ball edited his work for publication, it still reads as 
an incredibly personal, intimate account. This makes the reader wonder 
whether Ball deliberately exposed his life in this way in order to highlight 
the vulnerability of the self in general, but also specifically in the wartime 
context that provided the backdrop for his text.
Tzara’s ‘Zurich Chronicle’ is significantly shorter and less detailed 
than Ball’s It was originally published in Huelsenbeck’s Dada Almanach 
and only later as an independent text, and seems to simply document 
events as they happened. This is demonstrated particularly strongly by 
Motherwell’s edition of the text, which cuts out almost all typographic 
and visual interest, showing not only the highly varying representa-
tion of Dada texts but also a normalisation of deviance, as Dada has 
become increasingly academicised. However, the version that appears in 
Huelsenbeck’s Dada Almanach conveys a sense of excitement through 
typography that is then complemented every so often by Tzara’s personal 
reactions to these happenings, and it is instructive to analyse both the 
content and the events to which it relates.
This varying detail is a characteristic of La Nausée, and is particularly 
noticeable when Roquentin begins his entry with ‘rien de nouveau’ [noth-
ing new] (for example N, p. 20), yet goes on to describe his day in several 
pages’ worth of detail. While Tzara tends not to elaborate on the entries 
that imply such ‘nothing new’ dates, certain small linguistic fragments 
are repeated in a relatively insistent manner: for instance, he maintains a 
striking obsession with red lamps across the chronicle. This suggests a sen-
sitivity to and awareness of their effects and meaning. Richter describes 
the location of the Cabaret Voltaire (the Niederdorf district) as a ‘slightly 
disreputable quarter of the highly reputable town of Zurich’ (AA, p. 13). 
Niederdorf is a former Zurich red light district, something of which the 
Dadas would likely have been keenly aware, particularly with a heavy 
wartime police presence. An example of Tzara’s preoccupation is noted in 
the entry dated February 1916: ‘In the darkest of streets in the shadow of 
architectural ribs, where you will find discreet detectives amid red street 
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lamps’ (ZC, p. 15). This must have given a particularly ominous feel in 
the Niederdorf quarter—location of the Cabaret Voltaire—with its nar-
row medieval streets lined with tall buildings.
Tzara’s entry dated June 1916 contains a passage summarising the 
activities and development of Cabaret Voltaire:
The Cabaret lasted 6 months, every night we thrust the triton of the gro-
tesque of the god of the beautiful into each and every spectator, and the 
wind was not gentle—the consciousness of so many was shaken—tumult 
and solar avalanche—vitality and the silent corner close to wisdom or 
folly—who can define its frontiers?—the young girls slowly departed and 
bitterness laid its nest in the belly of the family-man. A word was born no 
one knows how DADADADA we took an oath of friendship on the new 
transmutation that signifies nothing, and was the most formidable protest, 
the most intense armed affirmation of salvation liberty blasphemy mass 
combat speed prayer tranquillity private guerrilla negation and chocolate 
of the desperate (ZC, p. 18; original formatting).
The ferocious energy with which this is described implies that this 
entry is significant in relation to the development of events as well as the 
diary more widely, and aspects of its vocabulary can be found across the 
rest of the chronicle. There is a particularly strong focus on references to 
explosions and harsh weather, for example ‘the subtle invention of the 
explosive wind’ and ‘the explosions of elective imbecility’ (ZC, pp. 24; 
25). The June 1916 entry and its ripples across the diary are reminis-
cent of Roquentin’s bouts of nausea, and its effects on his daily existence. 
Roquentin experiences the waves of nausea as explosions of his senses, 
often combined with the humidity of Bouville and an unusual sensitivity 
to the weather.
A heightened sensitivity to colour is integral to both accounts, per-
haps unsurprising for the artist, whose work would have revolved around 
manipulation of colours and forms. Tzara states in his May 1919 entry: 
‘Inaugurate different colours for the joy of transchromatic disequilib-
rium and the portable circus velodrome of camouflaged sensations’ (ZC, 
p. 34). Unlike Tzara, however, who revels in this disruption of chromatic 
normalcy, Roquentin’s sensitivity to colour is disquieting to him when he 
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does not yet understand his nausea. He reports an episode of discomfort 
that focuses on the changing colour of a pair of purple braces:
Les bretelles se voient à peine sur la chemise bleue, elles sont tout effacées, 
enfouies dans le bleu, mais c’est dans la fausse humilité: en fait, elles ne se 
laissent pas oublier, elles m’agacent par leur entêtement de moutons, 
comme si, parties pour devenir violettes, elles s’étaient arrêtées en route 
sans abandonner leurs prétentions (N, p. 37f ).
[The braces barely show up against the blue shirt, they are all faded, 
buried in the blue, but it is with false modesty: in fact, they do not let 
themselves be forgotten, they bother me with their pig-headed stubborn-
ness, as if, starting out with the aim to become purple, they had stopped 
mid-way without abandoning their aim.]
The nature of these episodes creates an ambiguity and alienation that, 
while initially disquieting, promotes an increased realisation of the sub-
jectivity of perception. This tension is highlighted particularly strongly 
by Roquentin’s choice of vocabulary: the use of adjectives such as ‘effacé’ 
(faded) and ‘enfoui’ (buried) contrast with verbs such as ‘agacer’ (to 
bother) and nouns such as ‘entêtement’ (stubbornness) in such a way 
as to create a gentle yet abrasive description that is at once passive and 
active, harmless and nauseating.
Just as Roquentin’s episodes of nausea get more frequent and all- 
pervading due to his increasing self-awareness, Tzara’s diary entries get 
more clustered and intense as the diary goes on, centring around impor-
tant events. The entries of early 1916 are longer and more detailed, docu-
menting the early days of the Cabaret Voltaire, but then a shorter series 
pile up from September and especially in the early months of 1917, when 
Dada was expanding throughout Zurich. The entries then mirror the 
earlier ones in size, expanding but getting less frequent through 1918 and 
1919. As the diary progresses Tzara also begins to reference repetition and 
newness (or lack thereof ), a concern that would plague Dada as its audi-
ence began to enjoy and not heckle their events. He notes that ‘the public 
appetite for the mixture of instinctive recreation and ferocious bamboula 
which we succeeded in presenting forced us to give on | May 19 [1917]| 
REPETITION OF THE OLD ART AND NEW ART EVENING’ 
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(ZC, p.  26; original formatting). In essence this occurrence represents 
a doubled repetition, in that the night itself is already centred around 
‘the old and new’ and the fact of repeating the night as a whole. This is 
further emphasised by the use of upper case, exaggerating the highlighted 
words in a way that is the visual equivalent of shouting. We have seen 
that repetition interrogates the notions of identicality and, through it, 
authenticity. It is therefore logical that repetition of such events should be 
undesirable. We might even wonder if this is the reason for which Tzara 
brought an end to Dada: a movement that had been born out of a desire 
for individual freedom and choice had stagnated into a recipe. In short, 
it was losing its authenticity.
Drawing together our analysis of the diary form, through Ball, Tzara 
and Sartre (in the form of Roquentin), we can posit that texts in this style 
create and maintain a unique and flexible relationship with time and 
truth. Joseph Halpern notes that
Sartre’s novels—Nausea, in particular—are more than illustrated syllo-
gisms; their metonymic unity opens onto the realm of similarity and rep-
etition, metaphor and synchrony. The strength of Sartre’s novels lies in the 
way they convey lived experience, but lived experience resists intelligibility 
(1979, p. 71).
This emphasis on similarity and repetition is certainly evident in 
Tzara’s chronicle. Ball’s text often draws upon descriptive metaphor for 
his synthesis of his environment and events. And all three accounts show 
a resistance to intelligibility that highlights the flawed or subjective nature 
of the process of historicisation. Ball’s diary is particularly useful to the 
scholar of Dada because it documents the earliest days of the movement 
from a first-hand point of view. Additionally, as the co-founder (with 
Emmy Hennings) of the Cabaret Voltaire, his account dates exactly to 
Dada’s beginnings (if we are to agree on Zurich as its birthplace and start-
ing point). Tzara’s account, though shorter, is informative in highlight-
ing moments of particular importance, and an idea of Dada—or at least 
Tzara’s—values starts to come through. Ball reported the purpose of the 
movement and its review as rejecting nationalism and labels, but which 
aspects did the Dadas promote? Identifying these values will give an idea 
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of how this heterogeneous movement wanted to be represented, as such 
allowing a nascent Dada philosophy to come to the fore.
 Manifestos, Morals and Mindsets
Through an assessment of Dada accounts and diaries, as well as interac-
tion with the written word in previous chapters, it is evident that Dada’s 
relationship with published material included a desire to be taken at its 
word, even if that word is deliberately fabricated. Despite evidence of 
such fabrication, however, examples of (anti-)morality come through 
such bold statements, especially in the movement’s own journals. Dada’s 
own little press essentially represents the movement’s public diary, or 
journal: an indelible and pseudo-live commentary on the movement’s 
activities and thoughts. Stoppard illustrates Dada’s opinions on the fickle 
nature of words in a debate between Carr and Tzara:
Don’t you see my dear Tristan you are simply asking me to accept that the 
word Art means whatever you wish it to mean; but I do not accept it.
— Carr
Why not? You do exactly the same thing with words like patriotism, 
duty, love, freedom, king and country…
— Tzara
(in T, p. 21)
Dada considered words manipulable, and by extension that meaning 
can be manipulated in a similar way. As such, the construction of tenets 
and morals is just as subjective as anything else. And as Huelsenbeck 
claimed, ‘Dada is the desire for a new morality’ (1974, p. 141). Perhaps 
the most direct proclamation of morals and values is in the manifestos, 
an active declaration of the Dada self. Let us take two examples of these 
manifestos to investigate Dada morality: Tzara’s infamous ‘Manifeste 
Dada 1918’ (published in the eponymous review Dada (D3)) and 
Picabia’s 1920 ‘Dada Philosophe’ (published in Littérature (L13)).
Early in his manifesto, Tzara engages in a critique of objectivity in the 
realm of aesthetics: ‘Une œuvre d’art n’est jamais belle, par decret [sic], 
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objectivement, pour tous. La critique est donc inutile, elle n’existe que 
subjectivement, pour chacun, et sans le moindre caractère de généralité’ 
[A work of art is never beautiful, by decree, objectively, for everyone. 
Criticism is thus useless, it exists only subjectively, for each individual, 
and with no element of universality] (D3, p. 1). This is furthermore 
expressed in his desire not to tell others how to act: ‘je n’ai pas le droit 
d’entraîner d’autres dans mon fleuve, je n’oblige personne à me suivre 
et tout le monde fait son art à sa façon’ [I do not have the right to drag 
others into my river, I do not force anyone to follow me and everyone 
makes their art in their own way] (D3, p. 1). We have seen that Sartre 
believes that we choose in a way which we believe would be universally 
applicable, but it would still remain inauthentic to impose our own 
way of thinking on others. This is a sentiment that is foregrounded in 
Tzara’s statement that ‘ceux qui appartiennent à nous gardent leur lib-
erté’ [those who belong to us retain their freedom] (D3, p. 1). Through 
this idea Tzara directly confronts philosophy, defying critics who claim 
that Dada did not engage with it. Indeed although his discussion of it is 
characteristically humorous, Tzara raises philosophical issues that have 
real value:
La philosophie est la question: de quel côté commencer à regarder la vie, 
dieu, l’idée, ou les autres apparitions. Tout ce qu’on regarde est faux. Je ne 
crois pas plus important le résultat relatif, que le choix entre gâteaux et 
cerises après dîner (D3, p. 2).
[Philosophy is the question: which angle from which to start to look at 
life, God, ideas, or other spectres. Everything we look at is false. I do not 
consider more important the relative result than the choice between cake 
and cherries after dinner]
Tzara’s thoughts show immediate alignment with Existentialist notions 
of the authenticity of personal choice: whether one chooses cake or cher-
ries is not as important as the act of choosing for oneself. As he states, ‘il 
n’y a pas de dernière Vérité’ [there is no final truth] (D3, p. 2). Through 
his theorising both that everything is false, and that there is no real truth, 
Tzara pre-empts Merleau-Ponty’s statement that we saw at the beginning 
of this chapter that ‘everything is truth in one’s conscience’ (PP, p. 437).
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Existentialism is often (falsely) accused of indifference. Indeed Sartre 
noted early on that ‘on lui a d’abord reproché d’inviter les gens à demeu-
rer dans un quiétisme du désespoir’ [it has been reproached for inviting 
people to live in a state of desperate quietism] (EH, p. 21). Tzara offers 
a novel alternative to indifference, and in doing so manages to refute 
a resulting denial of the choices of others: ‘Je nomme jem’enfoutisme 
[sic] l’état d’une vie où chacun garde ses propres conditions, en sachant 
toutefois respecter les autres individualités, sinon se défendre’ [I call 
Idon’tgiveadamnism [sic] the state of existence where each individual 
keeps their own conditions, knowing all the while how to respect other 
individualities, other than defending oneself ] (D3, p. 2). He later extends 
choice to the creation and subjectivity of morality:
La morale a determiné la charité et la pitié, deux boules de suif qui ont 
poussé comme des éléphants, des planètes et qu’on nomme bonnes. Elles 
n’ont rien de la bonté. La bonté est lucide, claire et décidé, impitoyable 
envers le compromis et la politique. La moralité est l’infusion du chocolat 
dans les veines de tous les hommes. Cette tâche n’est pas ordonnée par une 
force surnaturelle, mais par le trust des marchands d’idées et accapareurs 
universitaires (D3, p. 3).
[Morality has determined charity and pity, two dumplings that have 
grown up like elephants, planets, and that we call good. They have nothing 
good about them. Goodness is lucid, clear and decided, ruthless towards 
compromise and politics. Morality is the infusion of chocolate in the veins 
of all individuals. This task is not organised by a supernatural force, but by 
the trust of traders of ideas and academic monopolisers]
By rejecting bygone morals created by another, Dada takes responsibil-
ity for its own ethical position, as evidenced in Chap. 4 analysis of the 
rejection of common judgement values. Notably, Stoppard’s Tzara rejects 
the use of former ideas by claiming that ‘causality is no longer fashion-
able owing to the war’ (in T, p. 19). If ideas are not linked by causality, 
choice is foregrounded, in that it does not matter what choice is made, 
only that it is on one’s own grounds. We are reminded here of (the real) 
Tzara’s claim that ‘only contrast links us to the past’ (in Jakobson 1987, 
p. 39). Additionally, both of these quotations can be linked to Beauvoir’s 
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statement that ‘we do not love the past in its living truth if we stubbornly 
maintain fixed and mummified forms’ (MA, p. 118).
Sartre’s Roquentin depicts a similar rejection of common values 
through a group of women looking at a statue that represents a generic 
forefather. He states derisively that:
Au service de leurs petites idées étroites et solides il a mis son autorité et 
l’immense érudition puisée dans les in-folio que sa lourde main écrase. Les 
dames en noir se sentent soulagées, elles peuvent vaquer tranquillement 
aux soins du ménage, promener leur chien: les saintes idées, les bonnes 
idées qu’elles tiennent de leurs pères, elles n’ont plus la responsabilité de les 
défendre; un homme de bronze s’en fait le gardien (N, p. 49).
[In the service of their narrow and unchanging little ideas he put his 
authority and immense scholarship drawn from the in-folios crushed in 
his heavy hand. The women in black felt relieved, they could quietly tend 
to their household duties, walk their dogs: the virtuous ideas, the good 
ideas that they held onto from their fathers, they no longer had the 
responsibility of defending these ideas; a bronze man made himself their 
caretaker.]
These women are not only exempt from creating their own ideals, 
but they also do not have to even think about or take responsibility for 
them, as they are defended by a form of authority that precedes them. 
Additionally the non-identity of the statue means that these individuals 
do not care what form authority takes as long as they have faith in it as 
an ideal. This goes against both Dada and Existentialist ethics whereby 
everything, particularly systems, is questioned in order to believe in (yet 
not be defined by) ideals that stem from personal, specific choice.
Picabia’s ‘Dada Philosophe’ engages with what we might call a Dadaism 
or Dada theory through its title. Its opening section reflects Ball’s state-
ment cited at the beginning of the chapter, that of the supranational 
aims of Dada and the Cabaret Voltaire (both the place and the review). 
The manifesto performs a levelling of characteristics, as well as taking on 
a plethora itself, claiming that Dada simultaneously has aspects of mul-
tiple nationalities, and leading to a hybrid identity that we saw through 
fragmentation and assemblage in Chap. 2. By claiming to be so many 
nationalities, Picabia foregrounds the theory that the idea of nationality 
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is simply a construct, especially since the aspects he identifies with par-
ticular nations are often based in ridicule.
For example, he claims that ‘DADA a le cul en porcelaine, à l’aspect 
français’ [DADA has a porcelain ass, with a French look] (L13, p. 5). 
We may wonder whether this reference to porcelain represents a fragile 
purity as well as a standard of quality. However, this pure cleanliness, 
especially when related to toilet humour, may rather be incorporated into 
a Duchampian pun through his porcelain Fountain, parodying the cover-
ing up of less desirable qualities. I refer here to the infamous L.H.O.O.Q. 
[‘elle a chaud au cul’, roughly ‘she has a hot ass’], where we could replace 
the implicit ‘chaud’ with a phonetically identical whitewashing metaphor 
to create ‘elle [la France?] a [de la] chaux au cul’ [she (France?) has a 
whitewashed arse]. This would create yet another stinging Dada invective 
that accuses national interests of hiding undesirable qualities. Listing a 
wide variety of cultural references of which Dada ‘dreams’, the manifesto 
introduces an inherent ambiguity created by this multifaceted identity: 
‘Changeant et nerveux, DADA est un hamac qui berce un doux balance-
ment’ [changeable and nervous, DADA is a hammock that rocks and 
swings gently] (L13, p. 5). Not only does this changeability depend upon 
a balance of contradiction supported by Beauvoirian ambiguity, but also 
Picabia then goes on to claim that ‘nous ignorons le chemin qu’il faut 
choisir’ [we do not know which path we should take] (L13, p. 5): we have 
seen that in Sartrean thought, refraining from being influenced by that 
which one should do is preferred as a means to forming personal choices 
uninfluenced by external pressures.
These two manifestos foreground a constant balance of rejection of 
narratives and acceptance of egalitarian principles, leading to a general 
philosophy of choice and subjectivity, authenticity through ambiguity. 
Maurice Weyembergh shows us that the tension between acceptance and 
refusal through revolt leads to truth(s), in that ‘les vérités existentielles 
les plus profondes […] ne s’éprouvent que dans la contradiction, ce que 
montre la révolte elle-même avec son accent sur le oui et le non’ [the 
most profound existential truths […] only express themselves through 
contradiction, which shows revolt itself with its emphasis on the yes and 
the no] (in Guérin, ed., p. 918; my emphasis). This definition reminds us 
of Tzara‘s characterisation of Dada as ‘le point où le oui et le non et tous 
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les contraires se rencontrent’ [the point at which the yes and the no and 
all contradictions meet] (in Merz 7, p. 70; original emphasis/formatting), 
and the statement in his ‘Manifeste Dada 1918’ that ‘j’écris ce manifeste 
pour montrer qu’on peut faire les actions opposées ensemble, dans une 
seule fraîche respiration’ [I am writing this manifesto to show that it is 
possible to perform opposing actions together, in a single fresh breath] 
(in D3, p. 1).
Tzara’s desire for freshness through creativity is also expressed by 
Roquentin, who states that ‘J’écris pour tirer au clair certaines circon-
stances. […] Il faut écrire au courant de la plume; sans chercher les 
mots’ [I write in order to clarify certain circumstances […] It is neces-
sary to write off the cuff; without searching for words] and that ‘J’ai 
besoin de me nettoyer avec des pensées abstraites, transparentes comme 
de l’eau’ [I need to cleanse myself with abstract thoughts that are trans-
parent like water] (N, p. 87). While contradiction and clarity may ini-
tially be unhappily combined, we can instead consider both types of 
writing active desires to interrogate thought and versions of the truth, 
especially through spontaneity (‘without searching for words’). We have 
seen that Huelsenbeck explains the embracing of rejection by claim-
ing that ‘the fact that the Dadaists said no was less important than the 
manner in which they said it’ (cf. DE, p. 144). This cements our notion 
that it is the telling that is key, rather than the certainty of the content 
portrayed.
 Conclusion
When Tzara was asked for permission to use the name Dada on the 
avant-garde periodical New York Dada, he was compelled to respond that 
the very idea of the request was absurd: ‘You ask permission to name 
your periodical Dada. But Dada belongs to everybody’ (in Ades ed. 2006, 
p. 159). However, as Ades elucidates, ‘whether they were seriously inter-
ested in forming an alliance with Tzara’s movement or were operating 
an ironic game of testing the very idea of ownership that the notion of 
“authorisation” introduces is impossible to say’ (ed. 2006, p. 146). This 
rejection of both authorisation and authority is also present in Dada’s 
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response to the reactions of others. For example, Richter related his 
thoughts on Dada scholarship:
If I am to believe the accounts which appear in certain books about this 
period, we founded an association of revolutionary artists, or something 
similar. I have no recollection of this at all, although Janco has confirmed 
that we signed manifestos and pamphlets, and Georges Hugnet (who 
admittedly gets his information at second hand) says that Tzara received 
one of these manifestos from me, scored through it with red pencil, and 
refused to publish it in Der Zeltweg. I regard this as doubtful. Tzara was no 
red-pencil dictator (AA, p. 80; my emphases).
It is instructive that Tzara is not denied having refused something, just 
that he refused to red-pencil it. This underlines the difference between 
rejection of the undesirable, and imposition of external morals. The con-
stant replacement or addition (or removal, in Richter’s case above) of 
truths to accounts creates an impression of chaos, one which loops back 
on itself in its perpetual redefinition. As Huelsenbeck describes, ‘Dada is 
the chaos out of which a thousand orders arise which in turn entangle to 
form the chaos of Dada’ (in Sheppard 2000, p. 195).
We can link notions of truth to subjectivity of the perception and 
interpretation of reality, and as C. D. Innes states on Travesties, ‘repre-
senting reality […] depends on the artist’s capacity to see what reality is. 
And Stoppard underlines that Joyce is almost blind, needing heavy spec-
tacles for his astigmatism, that Tzara sports a monocle, and that Carr’s 
memory is particularly unreliable’ (2006, p. 228). To add to this, in Artist 
Descending, Sophie is blind. We have seen through the exploration of real-
ity in Chap. 3 that reality has no inherent structure, but is instead shaped 
by our own, personal experience of it: thus, it inevitably contains or rep-
resents chaos from time to time. Ball writes that ‘perhaps it is necessary to 
have resolutely, forcibly produced chaos and thus a complete withdrawal 
of faith before an entirely new edifice can be built up on a changed basis 
of belief ’ (FT, p. 60). We can therefore consider that the embracing of 
chaos in general, and contradiction in particular, is mutually dependent 
on an assertion of absolute freedom through personal choice unfettered 
by external pressures. As Ball claimed, ‘perfect skepticism makes perfect 
[AU27]
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freedom possible’ (FT, p. 59), and Tzara that ‘comment veut-on ordon-
ner le chaos qui constitue cette infinie informe variation: l’homme?’ [how 
can we order the chaos that makes up this infinitely shapeless variation: 
man?] (in D3, p. 1).
The balance of chaos and order within reality has a strong link to the 
imaginary, which we have already assessed in terms of chaos in film and 
its links with the effect of pareidolia. Imagination allows us to plug gaps 
in the truth, as is indeed perfectly necessary in works such as Travesties, 
with its frequent slips and cuts. Applied to an account, imagination ren-
ders the banal memorable and, in extension,
pour que l’événement le plus banal devienne une aventure, il faut et il suffit 
qu’on se mette à le raconter. C’est ce qui dupe les gens: un homme, c’est 
toujours un conteur d’histoires, il vit entouré de ses histoires et des histoires 
d’autrui, il voit tout ce que lui arrive à travers elles; et il cherche à vivre sa 
vie comme s’il la racontait (N, p. 64; original emphasis).
[in order that the most banal event become an adventure, it is necessary 
and sufficient to start to tell it. That is what tricks people: a person is always 
a storyteller, they live surrounded by their stories and those of others, they 
see everything that happens to them through these stories, and they try to 
live their life as if they were telling it.]
The various Dada accounts of the movement certainly demonstrate 
that the telling (and re-telling) of stories is important to its history as a 
series of improvised, spontaneous adventures. The emphasis on imagina-
tion reminds us of the need to question accounts, to maintain intellectual 
curiosity at all times. For the Existentialists, the truth of something takes 
a backseat to a person’s attitude towards it. This is notably illustrated by 
Beauvoir’s ideas on ‘internal truth’, in that ‘la valeur d’un acte n’est pas 
dans sa conformité à un modèle extérieur, mais dans sa vérité intérieure’ 
[the value of an act is not in its conformity to an external model, but in its 
internal truth] (MA, p. 171; original emphasis). Additionally Roquentin’s 
views can be used to describe Dada’s own self-historicising nature, as well 
as its view of ‘History’ as contingent, arbitrary, and partial. This view of 
history and (hi)stories aligns with Sartre’s views on temporality, particu-
larly his theory of the non-existence of the past, present and future.
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Beauvoir writes that ‘c’est parce que la condition de l’homme est 
ambiguë qu’à travers l’échec et le scandale il cherche à sauver son exis-
tence’ [it is because the individual’s condition is ambiguous that through 
failure and scandal they try to save their existence], and furthermore that 
‘l’art, la science ne se constituent pas malgré l’échec, mais à travers lui’ 
[art and science do not establish themselves despite failure, but through it] 
(MA, pp. 160; 161; my emphasis). Dada’s artistic output is predominantly 
defined by an ethos of improvisation and spontaneity. Thus inevitable 
failure allowed for the development of expression, a  constant redefini-
tion of the movement’s sense of self, along with the fact that humour 
was a central part of Dada, with members constantly egging others on 
and ironically allowing a sense of centredness in the chaos in which they 
lived and worked. Ball explained that ‘the special circumstances of these 
times […] do not allow real talent either to rest or mature and so put its 
capabilities to the test’ (FT, p. 67). The uncertainty consequently raised 
with the contemporary reader is not only part of Dada’s constant desire 
not to be fixed in a certain cultural memory, but also appears to embrace 
Beauvoir’s conclusions on ambiguity (cf. MA, p. 14). We might conclude, 
therefore, that Dada’s fluctuating relationship with reality, truth, decep-
tion and façade lends itself richly to explorations of authenticity through 
ambiguity. Dada’s structure as ‘not a dogma or a school, but rather a con-
stellation of individuals and free facets’ (Tzara in Ades ed. 2006, p. 44) 
allows the individual to strive for authenticity through spontaneity, ambi-
guity, and the embracing of multiple or hybrid identities.
Alternatively, to re-conclude with Tzara’s bizarre but instructive 
thoughts on the ambiguity of truth,
On croit pouvoir expliquer rationnellement, par la pensée, ce qu’on écrit. 
Mais c’est très relatif. La pensée est une belle chose pour la philosophie 
mais elle est relative. […] La dialectique est une machine amusante qui 
nous conduit /d’une maniere [sic] banale/ aux opinions que nous aurions 
eu en tout cas. Croit-on, par le raffinement minutieux de la logique, avoir 
démontré la vérité et établi l’exactitude de ces opinions? Logique serrée par 
les sens est une maladie organique. Les philosophes aiment ajouter à cet 
élément: Le pouvoir d’observer. Mais justement cette magnifique qualité 
de l’esprit est la preuve de son impuissance. On observe, on regarde d’un 
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ou de plusieurs points de vue, on les choisit parmi les millions qui existent. 
L’expérience est aussi un résultat de l’hazard [sic] et des facultés individu-
elles (in D3, p. 2; original formatting).
[We believe that we can explain rationally, through thought, that which 
we write. But it is very relative. Thought is a beautiful thing for philosophy 
but it is relative. […] Dialectics is an amusing machine that drives us to 
have/in a banal manner/the opinions that we would have had anyway. Do 
we believe, by painstaking refinement of logic, that we have revealed the 
truth and established the accuracy of these opinions? Logic that is hemmed 
in by the senses is an organic disease. Philosophers like adding to this ele-
ment: the power of observation. But really this wonderful quality of mind 
is proof of its powerlessness. We observe, we look at things from one or 
many points of view, we choose them from the millions that exist. 
Experience is also a result of chance and individual faculties.]
Tzara foregrounds several fundamental elements of truth and rational-
ity, which also strengthens our links with Existentialism. He shows that 
writing and thought are both subjective and situational, as well as hold-
ing the potential for dangerous manipulation. He repeatedly highlights 
the desire for final or singular truth as a ‘disease’, primarily because it 
seeks to eradicate the individual, and the chance for personal choice or 
chance itself.
The exploration of storytelling and history demonstrates the ethical, 
epistemic importance of the subjectivity of truth from a perspective of 
Dada. But the challenging of truth and reality initiated in part by Dada 
also had long-lasting effects on the way we continue to perceive our envi-
ronment. The Dada accounts manipulate both reality and history, and 
the movement more widely has led to a new way of thinking that was 
rebellious at the time, but has now been incorporated into the normalcy 
of the contemporary world. The assimilation of the revolutionary into 
the routine has impermeably changed the way the movement is remem-
bered, as well as the way in which we approach history and even histori-
ography: the Dada spirit has become omnipresent.
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